

Unpacking Democratic Transitions: The Case of Libya

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Executive Summary

Rishita Apsani

The euphoria that originally characterized the Arab Spring was, in retrospect, entirely premature. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt—the Jasmine and Tahrir Revolutions—seemed to offer great hope for democratic change in the MENA region, particularly since both resulted in relatively peaceful regime change. Yet the path to “democracy” was not as painless in other countries: civil war engulfed Libya and Syria, complicating the image of populist driven and peaceful transitions. Though it was global economic crisis and neo-patrimonial political structures that fomented protest in all cases, the totality of authoritarianism that characterized Libyan and Syrian rule resulted in conflict-driven regime change. In the case of Libya, mass demonstrations culminated in extended periods of fighting between Gaddafi forces and opposition groups across the country. It was, in large part, due to the extended support of NATO coalition forces that the protracted nature of the conflict was broken. Continued economic and military support managed to fracture Gaddafi’s security forces and bring victory for the rebels. After a precarious transition, in July 2012, Libya held its first elections in 52 years with a fair amount of success. As this government began rule, it appeared as though the promise of the Arab Spring was finally realized.

However, as the articles in this report attempt to illustrate, the democratic overtures of elections should not be mistaken for substantive democracy in the country. Indeed, it is still not clear whether the highly tenuous post-regime situation will revert to civil war or stabilize into a sustainable transition. Gaddafi left behind a malfunctioning state, with weak governmental institutions and little to no civil society, both of which are necessary to the task of post-transition state building. The current government is suffering from many deficiencies, including a democratic deficit and a number of geographic and secular-Islamist divisions, that prevent cohesion and effective governance. There has been frustration over the rampant corruption and infighting that has characterized current political rule. The International Crisis Group estimates that real military power lies with the 100 militias containing over 125,000 armed Libyans, all looking to retain their military power and geographic autonomy. Under these circumstances, fledgling state institutions have struggled to create a monopoly on legitimate violence, centralize political power, and cultivate social capital among civilians. Meanwhile, traumas of international intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq has stultified any extended form of involvement from Western powers, both in terms of “boots on the ground” and overt military assistance. The picture of a weak, quasi-legitimate government seeking to impose control over a myriad of militias with a certain degree of populist appeal does not bode well for Libyan democracy. The democratic and security deficit is also preventing the establishment of a well-functioning economy. Not only has violence resulted in diminished oil production, but

attempts to direct public spending towards infrastructure and social services has largely been squandered.

The security and political crisis have far reaching implications for all sectors of Libyan society, and by extension, its prospects for democracy. Currently, Libya has struggled to establish both a monopoly on legitimate violence and a viable social contract between the state and its citizens, both of which are crucial thresholds for any stable regime. Yet these shortcomings, though troubling, are necessary “rites of passage” for all newly instituted democracies. To this effect, the fate of democracy in Libya does not rest on current institutional failures, but rather how these deficits are contended with and overcome in the upcoming years. In this regard, success for the regime lies in being able to fashion hybrid political institutions that are able to overcome the disparate regional grievances preventing effective governance. As the article on political institutions points out, creating and enforcing a new constitution is vital in this regard. On the security front, our authors suggest that soliciting and diverting foreign aid into strengthening the military might be an effective solution. Finally, it is crucial that oil exports return to their maximum output levels so revenue might be diverted towards establishing a cogent welfare state and infrastructure in the country. This can be achieved through concentrating security forces towards stabilizing sites of production.

Overcoming the Might of the Militias

Hardeep Dhaliwal

The fall of Gadhafi's regime paved the way for Libya to transform its political processes and become a more democratic country. However, efforts to transition Libya into a democracy remain futile as the government has yet to successfully employ a state-run army to defend national interests. Due to the absence of unified state security, militias that were developed to topple leader Col Gadhafi in 2011 still operate and control regions in which they were formed.¹ The presence of these forces has created a blockage within the government to build a strong post-revolutionary democratic Libya. Additionally, civil unrest caused by rivalries among the militias has caused further chaos and political disorder within the country, therefore hindering any political advancement. It thus becomes essential for Zeidan's government to first resolve the crisis of the militias before fulfilling their mandate to transition Libya into a democracy. Over the past two years, it has become evident that Libya is unable to restrain the growing number of militia forces in the country. If the country has hopes of sustaining its tenuous democratic status, it must utilize aid from key international actors to suppress the mercenaries and continue to transition Libya into a post-Gadhafi era. Without this, it is certain that Libya will be unable to escape Gadhafi's poisonous legacy.

In early October, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was kidnapped by a group of armed militiamen from a Tripoli hotel and was held hostage for several hours at an interior ministry anti-crime department.² Zeidan was rescued and brought to safety by local residents backed up by brigades.³ Upon his release, Zeidan asserted that his kidnappers had attempted a coup d'état against the government; which had resulted from the opponents not being able to secure sufficient votes in the Congress. This event epitomized the fragile and vulnerable state of the Libyan government. The ability of a militia group to kidnap the Libyan Prime Minister indicates the lack of political control the government is able to exert over the militias. To this effect, it becomes plausible for militia groups to overthrow the current Libyan government and successfully implement a coup d'état in the future. Therefore, the necessity of the government to form a national army with the help of major powers to divert militia activity becomes essential to preserve political order and safety. In light of this event, the United Nations along with the U.S., UK and France have recognized the abduction and are extending support to the Libyan government to make a transition to democracy.⁴

¹ Jawad, 2013

² Al Jazeera, 2013

³ Al Jazeera, 2013

⁴ Al Jazeera, 2013

Furthermore, coup d'états are characterized by an enduring internal rivalry (EIR), which are extended violent conflicts between governments and insurgent groups within the state.⁵ These conflicts are often extended because of the resistance of the insurgents to disarm through a settlement agreement. The insurgents rarely sign these negotiations, as they are aware of the government's incentive to default on the deal. It is apparent that there is an EIR exists between the Libyan government and the militia groups since the fall of Gadhafi's regime. The inability of government to push out the militias due to their resistance in communication coupled with an absent police force to defend government communication demands; the likelihood of negotiations becomes improbable. However, these problems of negotiations can be addressed through third parties. Thus, suggesting that the intervention by the U.S., UK, France and the UN are necessary to support and facilitate discussions between the Libyan government and the militias.

Furthermore, Libya's inability to govern militia groups is imposing a threat to state sovereignty. Recently, eastern Libya declared autonomous regional government with an official ceremony, challenging the country's weak central government (Aljazeera, 2013). Thus, exhibiting that the Libyan government has little control over civilian groups and militias due to the absence of a national state army. Such groups are utilizing the state's inability to assume unifying power over rebels and groups to their advantage by creating regimes that follow their ideals. If the Libyan government does not take quick action to repress such groups than there is a likely possibility for the emergences of self-government declared in other regions of Libya. Such circumstances will ultimately lead Libya to become a failed state. In order to prevent this, the Libyan government must form a state military that will be able to control the usurping mercenaries. To do so, Libya must employ help from major powers and the UN to help transition Libya into a democracy. Gaining control of militia governed regions and eliminating the presence of the armed groups will accomplish this.

Recently, deadly clashes between militia groups in Tripoli led to Zeidan ordering Misrata militia groups to leave the capital within three days.⁶ The Misrata militia is one of the most powerful armed groups currently occupying Tripoli. It is believed that their departure will bring peace and security to the region. Three days following Zeidan's orders, the militia refused to depart the city. This resulted in citizens protesting against the militia group. The protest soon took a violent turn when militiamen began to open fire at the unarmed civilian protestors⁷. It was the bloodiest day witnessed in Tripoli since the end of the war in 2011. Dozens of people were killed and hundreds were injured during protests to evict the Misrata militia from its headquarters (IR6). Since then, most of the militia forces from Misrata have pulled out of Tripoli

⁵ Kegley and Blanton, 2013

⁶ Al Jazeera, 2013

⁷ Aljazeera, 2013

(IR6). The victory of Libyan citizens and national security forces over the militias was celebrated by both indulging in a Libyan delicacy, baryooshes.⁸ Libyan citizens have begun to feel a sense of safety in the city due to the departure of the militia groups and the building of a strong and unified state police force. However, officials must refrain from reacting passively to this latest incident as it may fuel a cycle of revenge attacks, which could spiral out of control.⁹ Thus, suggesting that efforts to keep the militia groups from returning to the city must be maximized. One such effort would be to employ help from prominent international powers to construct of strong national army to divert militia activity. Furthermore, major powers could help facilitate negotiations between the militias and the government regarding their permanent dismantlement.

The future of a Libyan democracy looks promising in light of recent events. It becomes apparent that both the government of Libya and its citizens yearn for a peaceful and secure state. The state and citizens are exhibiting unification and supporting the construction of a national police force. Due to this parallel, moving towards a democratic post-Gadhafi era becomes less difficult. For further progression, Libya must seize the opportunity to drive out the remaining militias with the support of a national police force but until one is constructed, they must accept aid from key international actors.

⁸ Aljazeera, 2013

⁹ Aljazeera, 2013

The Absence of Solidarity: Political Institutions

Meghan Schwan

Two years after the October 2011 liberation of Libya and death of the ruler Muammar al-Qadhafi, the state has begun to re-establish itself as an emerging democracy. Libya has begun reconstructing political institutions that were otherwise absent under the Qadhafi rule. During the 42 year reign, the Qadhafi regime pursued a policy of “statelessness” – rejecting parliamentary democracy and the formation of political parties – thus preventing the development of effective governing institutions. Qadhafi exercised total control over political institutions in Libya through the “Revolutionary Sector” - a political body consisting of Qadhafi, his family members, and members of the Revolutionary Command Council.¹⁰ He ensured subordinate institutions were fragmented and overlapping, thus prohibiting any institution from challenging his authority.¹¹ In essence, Qadhafi was the only “institution” within Libya. The death of this leader and the collapse of the state has left little framework to establish legitimate political institutions within.

It is important to first examine the formation of a governing institution within Libya. In 2012, the National Transitional Council (NTC) – the main opposition group to Qadhafi during the time of the revolution and the transitional government after the leaders were ousted – dissolved and gave way to the General National Congress (GNC).¹² The GNC marked the first emergence of democracy within the country. The 200-member Congress was elected in the nation’s first free national election in six decades¹³. International observers noted that despite isolated events of violence, the election has been viewed as being conducted fairly. The ballot was composed of 374 political parties, each garnering support from localized areas.¹⁴ This was a product of the exploited tribal and regional conflicts created by Qadhafi. The GNC is thus fractionalized, and lacks a cohesive political body needed for unilateral control of the state. None the less, the first successful election indicates advancement towards the founding of a legitimate political body. If the election process continues, and power is invested in a representative body, there is hope that political control, in time, will be passed to a stable and accountable body. The state could benefit from international assistance to structure and

¹⁰ “Libya Profile,” *BBC News Africa*, October 11, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897>.

¹¹ Boduszynski, Mieczystaw P, and Duncan Pickard. “Tackling the Arab Spring: Libya Starts from Scratch.” *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 87.

¹² McQuinn, Brian. “Assessing (In)security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Libya.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46, no. 4 (2013): 718.

¹³ “Libyan Election Success for Secularist Jibril’s Bloc” *BBC News Africa*, July 18, 2012, accessed November 2, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18880908>.

¹⁴ McQuinn, Brian. “Assessing (In)security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Libya.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46, no. 4 (2013): 718.

monitor future GNC elections. The state must ensure that equilibrium within the political body is established; where a balance is struck between secular, tribal, and Islamist powers. If power is centered in the hands of one group, the progress that has made by the state is challenged.

The Congress appointed Ali Zedani as Prime Minister October 2012, in attempt to centralize power¹⁵. The kidnapping of Zedani in October 2013 however, reflects the weakness of the Libyan government and highlights the government's lack of control over militias groups within the state.¹⁶ This situation is exacerbated by further unlawful actions by government Ministers. Moreover, there are noted cases of Ministers resigning only to "lay charges against their Prime Minister and condemn the positions of the political powers."¹⁷ This is accompanied by reports of the theft of public finances and the waste of public resources – indicating corruption is still evident within the government and further hinders the already weak public support of a federal government.¹⁸ These incidents hollow the state's attempts to form working political institutions.

In order for Libya to achieve the goals of the revolution, the current political actors must establish a well-defined constitution. The constitution must equally represent each regional, ethnic, and religious group. It must define a rule of law and a political system that includes institutional checks and balances. The state is currently undergoing the constitution building process. In August 2011, the NTC made its first attempt to draft a constitution. The NTC originally called for a body of 60 members from the GNC to be appointed and to draft a permanent constitution.¹⁹ The Libyan Supreme Court, ruling this attempt to be unconstitutional, struck down this attempt (Jounal). In April 2013, the GNC state declared that the 60 member-body was to be popularly elected in a vote later this year.²⁰

The constitution-building process will be a critical step towards stabilizing the government. However, this process faces the reoccurring challenge to provide representation to the regional and ethnic diversity within the country. It will be interesting to see how the public responds to the constitution. Under Qadhafi, local Libyan demands went unaddressed as Qadhafi prioritized the interests of Tripoli and Sirte. Localism thus may thwart national-level

¹⁵ Libya Profile," *BBC News Africa*, October 11, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897>.

¹⁶ "Libyan PM Ali Zeidan Detained by Militia," *BBC News Africa*, October 10, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24470850>.

¹⁷ "Lybia: The Growth of Conflict on Narrow Interest Threatens the Fragile State," *AL Jazeera Center for Studies*, September 4, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2013/08/201382911115814964.htm>

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Boduszynski, Mieczystaw P, and Duncan Pickard. "Tackling the Arab Spring: Libya Starts from Scratch." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 89.

²⁰ Ibid.

collaborations and the construction of national level institution. The GNC now must establish a constitution while in the midst of establishing itself, dealing with internal divides, and trying to manage the democratic transition.

Trying to establish democracy and institution side-by-side is an immensely challenging task. Libya has been internally divided and exploited for most of the past century, and at times isolated from the international community. The hope for Libya's progress forward towards democracy requires working institutions that can legitimize the state and deliver public goods to its citizens. The government is in the process of re-establishing itself since the fall of Qadhafi. The major challenge lies in uniting the country by diffusing regional, ethnic, and tribal tensions in favour of nationalism. As newspaper headlines note, this process has not occurred free of violence or setbacks. The government must control the militias group, and stimulate the state's weak economy.

Ethnic and Tribal Relations

Angie Sangha

The Ethnic and Tribal Relations of Libya play an instrumental role on Libyan politics. Tribes are an important element embedded in the social fabric of Arab societies in the Middle East.²¹ Tribes are “social units with an authority structure and shared common identity in a society.”²² These units are largely based on kin relations, and have important political implications for the state, particularly during elections. The social structures of Libya, rest largely on tribal affiliations. Libya accounts for hundreds of individual tribes and twenty main groupings.

Most recently, tribal contributions in the state political structure have proven to be very important and effective. In the last three to four decades Libya, has come to the forefront of this verifying the truth of this hypothesis. Tribal identity has become a primary association of Libyan politics. The Tribal networks of Libya have taken new and varied forms and have not always been stagnant. A huge transition in tribal politics was seen under the Gaddafi regime, it had gone from an informal social organization to a central player in the economic and political realms of the Libyan State.²³

The relation between tribe and state has been an important framework of Libya. Studies done by Dick Vandewalle attributes the importance of tribe-state relations as part of larger developmental process in which primordial relations are fading away and there is increasing power in political tribal identity.²⁴ Libya has been challenging modernization by relying on traditional authority structures. Moreover, the weak political and social institutions of Libya have been a catalyst in bolstering tribal importance in state politics. This was a central theme in the Gaddafi regime as an authoritarian regime with weak institutions resulting in the coup and Libyan revolution. It was clear that tribal identity was used as government strategy to produce and promote effectively tribal nationalism and the strengthening Gaddafi’s control over the state. The recent Libyan revolution highlighted Muammar Gaddafi’s expertise in his ability to manipulate tribal rivalries to sustain his power. As soon as Gaddafi’s popularity declined the realization that manipulating tribal relations was in his best interest in maintaining power. In 1993 a coup attempted by the Warfalla tribe on Gaddafi was a breaking point in Gaddafi’s attempts to emphasize tribal loyalty.²⁵ He did this by setting rival tribes against one another

²¹ Hweio, Haala. “Tribes in Libya: From Social Organization to Political Power.” *African Conflict and Peace Building Review* 2.1 (2012): 112.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ Hweio, Haala. “Tribes in Libya: From Social Organization to Political Power.” *African Conflict and Peace Building Review* 2.1 (2012): 114.

²⁵ Baxley, Richard. “Shifting Loyalties: Libya’s Dynamic Tribalism” *Harvard International Review* (2014): 6.

and rewarding loyal tribes with political appointments. Tribal loyalty with Gaddafi meant tribal power and importance. It was a strategic plan to separate and segregate Libya's tribes and up until the coup of 2011 it was evident that there was no way to unify Libya as one state with the emergence and deep divisions among tribes.

During the time of the monarchy, King Idris Senusi tried to moderate and weaken the influence of tribes. Hayford argues that "Libya during the monarchy made substantial progress toward nation-building"²⁶ This was effective in allowing the young people of Libya to hold the government responsible for issues that were not in the jurisdiction of tribes. Libya was progressing very well until the coup of 1969 that overthrew the monarchy and thus the authoritarian regime of Gaddafi had begun to rule. The incorporation of tribalism was evident in nearly all-political structures of Libya. It is nearly impossible to understand Libyan politics without the consideration and role of tribes. For many Libyans, tribal affiliation had become a central theme in their everyday lives. It was the only way to get jobs, justice or financial support from the state. Tribalism was enshrined in the Libyan political and social institutions. Tribes became a defense mechanism against a very political chaotic Libya. Tribal loyalty strengthened the maintenance of Gaddafi's power.

²⁶ Hweio, Haala. "Tribes in Libya: From Social Organization to Political Power." *African Conflict and Peace Building Review* 2.1 (2012): 116.

An Overview of Socioeconomic Conditions

Oscar Crawford-Ritchie

The Libyan economy is almost entirely based on the energy sector, more specifically the large amount of national oil reserves located in Eastern Libya. According to the CIA world fact book 95% of Libyan exports, 80% of its GDP and 99% of the government's revenue comes directly from the energy sector. In 2012 its GDP per capita was \$12,300 (in American dollars). Even with all the revenue generated from oil reserves, the Libyan government under Gadhafi invested little in national infrastructure or to develop the economy. This made it increasingly difficult for the lower classes to do economically well, thereby preventing the formation of a stable middle class. Despite boasting rich oil reserves, prospects for economic diversification remain low. Because of Libya's poor soil, for example, agriculture is almost impossible to sustain as an industry, forcing Libyans to import about 80% of food from outside sources.²⁷ This trend is evident across various other sectors.

As discussed earlier, crude oil is by far Libya's biggest export. Its entire economy depends on the production and exportation of crude oil. The National Oil Corporation is the state owned oil producing company. It produces about 70% of Libya's total oil output with the rest being produced mainly by foreign private corporations.²⁸ Private Libyan oil companies do not have any real presence. The emergence of state sanctioned privately owned Libyan oil companies would be a welcome sign of the emergence of more democratic state in which the government doesn't hold all the economic power. Since the revolution the production of oil, and therefore the economy as a whole, has taken a hit. Before the war, in 2011, Libya had the capacity to produce up to 1.6 million barrels of crude oil per day.²⁹ In January 2013, Libya produced 1.4 million barrels of oil a day but decreased to less the 600,000 barrels per day in November 2013. This is a result of increased protesters who closed export terminals as well as militate efforts to independently sell oil. The Libyan government claimed that in only 5 months they lost \$1 billion in revenue because of the drop in oil exports and forced a deficit in the budget.³⁰ This is taking away money that could be going to stabilize the divided nation as well as build up infrastructure and improvements in health care and education.

The issue of independent militias and protestors are the biggest reason for the huge reduction in oil production over the last few months. In the last month, a powerful group seized

²⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. "Libya." The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html> (accessed November 14, 2013).

²⁸ Hargreaves, Steve. "Libya Oil Eyed by Western Companies." CNNMoney. http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/25/news/international/libya_oil/index.htm (accessed November 6, 2013).

²⁹ Al-Monitor. November 11, 2013

³⁰ Osama Al Sharif. "Libya's economy standing on the edge of a cliff." Al Bawaba. <http://www.albawaba.com/business/libya-oil-economy-535202> (accessed November 21, 2013).

control of oil reserves in Eastern Libya and declared themselves an independent regional government called the Cyrenaica Political Bureau. They further suggested that their own oil company was outside of the Libyan national state's control.³¹ As mentioned above, any oil not controlled, or at least taxed, by the national government takes away from the much need revenue and stuns economic growth in a very unstable time. Additional protests done by civil servants and national oil company employees shrinks the output of the government controlled reserves. In fact it was recently reported that the economy was expected to shrink by about 5% in 2013, mainly because of the reduction in oil exports.³² A reduction in crude production caused by these groups makes it significantly more difficult for the already weak central government to unite and stabilize the country.

The dependence on oil as their sole economic driver is very problematic especially in unstable times of oil reversers ownership. The militia controlled fields produce a huge problem for the entire economy and is making it increasingly difficult for the central government to do trade and therefore to stabilize the country economically. The government needs to not only regain control of the reserves but also diversify their economy as they are been attempting to do. Even though Libya's GDP per capita is one of the highest in all of Africa, in the past it's wealth has not evenly distributed meaning Lydia lacks a strong middle class³³ but it appears to be moving in the right direction. By diversifying their economy and entering sectors such as construction and the encouragement of non-state owned, but taxed, Libyan oil companies could help increase the economic power of the middle class and increase employment rates. The government has recently allocated \$68 billion to public spending targeted at improving national infrastructure, providing employment opportunities, and improving average living conditions.³⁴ Though this appears to be a positive step forward towards building a well-functioning democratic state, it must be followed up through.

³¹ Clifford Krauss,. "In Challenge, Former Rebels in Libya Form Own Oil Company." The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/world/africa/in-challenge-former-rebels-in-libya-form-own-oil-company.html?_r=0 (accessed November 12, 2013).

³² Reuters. "Libya's economy to shrink by 5.1% in 2013, says IMF." English Al Arabiya . <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2013/11/13/Libya-s-economy-to-shrink-by-5-1-in-2013-says-IMF.html> (accessed November 19, 2013).

³³ Central Intelligence Agency. November 14, 2013

³⁴ Al-Monitor. "The Turbulent History of Libya's Economy." Al-Monitor. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/09/libya-and-its-mismanaged-economy.html> (accessed November 11, 2013).

Libya in the World: Foreign Relations

Kirsten Campbell

Libya conducts bilateral relations with many countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Malta, Poland, Russia, Cyprus, Qatar, Turkey, and China. Libya also conducts relations with its immediate and regional neighbours, including Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Mali, and South Africa. In addition, Libya participates in multiple international organizations that might assist it to join the international community and consolidate its new “democratic status.” During the civil war, Libya also participated in the Contact Group on Libya, later named Friends of Libya, a group of 39 member states and other international organizations that met frequently in 2011 to support the NTC in efforts to overthrow the Qaddafi regime and come to the aid of the Libyan people³⁵.

Libya’s more recent history has determined how influential foreign actors are on Libya in their transition to democracy. Since 2003 and until the civil war, Qaddafi had attempted to normalize relations with Western nations³⁶. This has paused in the last span of his regime, however since the revolution relations with other nations have been extremely influential. One of the greatest contributors to Libya’s democratization aspirations has been the United States, as well as other European nations³⁷, and as a result Libya is guided by their influence. Libya is most vulnerable to the influence of regional powers, most prominently members of the Arab League. Due to the fact that the country has still not established a strong ruling body and continues to face security issues, they are vulnerable to outside pressures at this time.

Most aid was provided to Libya in 2011 during the Libyan Civil War. In the Libyan Revolution, the West sided with the Rebels, and as such, Western assistance was sent to help the rebels in their fight to take down the Qaddafi regime. International institutions such as the UN, IMF, and the World Bank led aid efforts to Libya.³⁸ As well, two top contributors of humanitarian aid were the United States, and then Australia.³⁹ Many European organizations also sent humanitarian aid to the country in 2011, the largest contributor being the European Community Humanitarian Office.⁴⁰ The top contributing European Union member states in 2011 included Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Denmark, and Italy.⁴¹ Turkey was also a major contributor of aid to Libya, giving approximately \$300 million to the NTC, as well as

³⁵ "Canada to Participate in Meetings of Contact Group on Libya and NATO Foreign Ministers."

³⁶ "Libya: Europa World Online."

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ "World Bank says to help with Libya rebuilding."

³⁹ Sedghi and Mash, "Humanitarian aid in Libya: how much has each country donated?,"

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

around 14 tons of food in humanitarian aid in 2011.⁴² All of these contributions were meant to aid the transitional government in their attempts to democratize the country, with the hopes of making it a more stable and cooperative power in the international system. In the two years since the revolution and the war, however, some foreign donors have pulled out of the country due to revived fears of Islamist terrorism.⁴³ Continued assistance still comes from the World Bank.⁴⁴

Due to the fact that Libya possesses some of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves, many foreign oil companies look for opportunities to invest in the Libyan oil fields. Many contracts were negotiated with the Qaddafi regime, yet many have yet to restart since the revolution.⁴⁵ While many nations invested in this area of business during the Qaddafi regime, there is now the current issue of oil licensing rounds. While these licenses draw high international interest, new rounds are unlikely to be successfully passed until Libya can establish a stable permanent government. There is also the issue of security and militia control of oil fields that needs to be addressed before new rounds can be successful. Other issues preventing greater foreign investment in Libya, besides insecurity, include government-enacted laws on foreign ownership, as well as the uncertain future of the transitional government. In 2012, the NTC set a law enacting a cap on foreign ownership in smaller joint ventures at 49%, while increasing the minimum required investment to 1 million dinars, approximately \$800,000.⁴⁶ Furthermore, these laws require any foreign partner firms to be at least 10 years old.⁴⁷ Property rights as well are unclear and make it difficult to buy land.⁴⁸ These restrictions by the transitional government were intended to eradicate corruption; the result is that foreign firms face greater restrictions on investing in Libya's economy.

As of 2012, Libya is ranked 58th in the world in terms of exports, bringing in approximately \$52.12 billion from exports last year.⁴⁹ Libya's primary export partners are mostly European, with a few exceptions. Libya's most prominent trading partners include Italy, Germany, China, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁵⁰ The Libyan export economy is primarily based on revenue from the energy sector, including electricity, crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas; these exports account for 95% of the country's

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Bernstead, Lust, and Wichmann, "It's Morning in Libya: Why democracy marches on."

⁴⁴ "World Bank Supports Libya in Building the Institutions of its New State."

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ "Business in Libya: A post-Qaddafi pause."

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ "The World Factbook."

⁵⁰ Ibid.

total export earnings.⁵¹ The other main commodities exported by Libya are chemicals. The energy sector is a very lucrative business to be involved in, and the export products are crucial to the functioning of Libya's export partners. Relations with these other nations are very beneficial. The substantial revenue from these sectors related to energy contributes to the country having one of the highest Gross Domestic Products per capita in Africa.⁵² Since the revolution, however, the production and export of oil has been depleted due to insecurity, resurgent militias, and lack of government control. Libya's largest export sector is greatly tied to its transition to democracy. The militias are using oil to prevent the transitional government from moving forward. Internationally, Libya's export partners lend support to the new government, as they need it to be stable in order to obtain their greatly needed oil.

Libya's location in North Africa puts the nation in close proximity to many other countries. Bordering neighbours of Libya include Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt.⁵³ Libya also has its Northern border along the Mediterranean Sea, and as such is in close proximity to other Mediterranean nations, most prominently Italy, making it a European gateway to Africa, and vice-versa.⁵⁴ Libya's neighbours have had a significant influence in Libyan politics and internal affairs. In the past and present, Libya has been influenced by North African Solidarity efforts, as well as the notion of Arab nationalism.⁵⁵ The greatest example of this can be seen in the Arab Spring. Unrest began in Tunisia in 2010, and then spread to Egypt.⁵⁶ The dictatorial regimes in these nations were overthrown and unseated, triggering popular uprisings in Libya in early 2011.⁵⁷ The occurrences in these two neighbouring nations caused the beginning of the Libyan revolution, resulting in civil war; the UN authorized international involvement in the conflict, and the Qaddafi regime was overthrown by mid-2011.⁵⁸ The influence of their two nearest neighbours helped to spark the revolution and change in government.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² "The World Factbook."

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Draper, "New Old Libya."

⁵⁵ "Libya: Europa World Online."

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

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