Territorial Disputes over the Northern Sea Route

Team Leader: Hannah Barltrop

Research Analyst: Kristen Rasmusson

The arctic has become a major focus of interest in global politics. The melting of sea ice due to global warming has opened the possibility for alternative shipping routes. The opening of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) will offer significantly shorter times for sea navigation. Currently, the NSR is seen as the most viable shipping route, acting as an alternative to the Suez Canal.[i] Despite many states wanting to take advantage of the shorter route, issues surrounding territorial claims must be considered. 

Current Issues Surrounding Territorial Disputes

The states with coastal frontage in the Arctic ocean include Canada, The United States, Norway, Denmark, and Russia.[ii] Deciding the location of boundaries is a major point of contention between these states. Other states claim the arctic is a “global commons” with no state having sovereignty over the area. Other challenges include questions over passage rights, domestic and international waters, the length of the continental shelf and the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) - the area extending two hundred nautical miles from a country’s coast.[iii]

The international laws in place to settle these disputes are the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. According to the UNCLOS, states have sovereign rights over resources in an area extending 200 nautical miles which is known as the EEZ.[iv] Sovereignty claims over the area extending past a state’s EEZ must be submitted to the United Nations Continental Shelf Commission.[v]

Who controls the Northern Sea Route?

Russia has claimed sovereignty over the NSR, as much of the route lies along the Siberian coast and is within Russia’s EEZ. Russia also considers the narrowest part of the route’s straits as internal waters. This claim allows Russia to assert control over transit passage from foreign ships. The basis for their claim is Article 234 of the UNCLOS, which gives coastal states “the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone.”[vi] Foreign ships who wish to go through the NSR have to apply for the necessary permits and approval from Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration. There is also a fee associated with access to the route and ice-breaking assistance.[vii]

Russia’s claim that the NSR covers internal waters is the focus of a dispute with the United States and the European Union. The U.S. did not sign the UNCLOS and considers the route to be in international waters that cannot be subject to national laws.[viii] While this is also the EU’s official stance, Denmark defies this and claims ownership of a portion of the Arctic. This is also the position of the EU.[ix]

Possible Future Disputes

As the NSR becomes more navigable, there is a possibility for further disputes. Article 234 of the UNCLOS allows control over “ice-covered areas”.[x] As the route becomes less and less ice-covered, the validity of Russia’s control may be challenged. Russia may be willing to react with military force, as it has done in the past, to defend its territorial claims.[xi] This can threaten arctic cooperation and cause a rise in tensions with other states.

Mitigation Strategies

Companies who are thinking of using the NSR should consider the implications of sovereignty claims. This includes the possible fees associated with shipping and the need for permits. Future shipping using the NSR may also depend on cooperation with Russia, as has been the approach of China.[xii]  More specifically, China is contributing to investments in infrastructure along the route to service future maritime traffic. The possibility that Russian control over the route may diminish in the future should also be considered. This may lead to a decrease in the existing fees and regulations. However, this possibility should not be counted on as it is unlikely Russia would be willing to reduce its control over the territory.

 

[i] Margaret Blunden. "Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 88, no. 1 (2012): 2. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41428544.

[ii] Nikoloz Janjgava. "Disputes in the Arctic: Threats and Opportunities." Connections 11, no. 3 (2012): 3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326289.

[iii] Ibid, 3.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel and Scott Stephenson. “Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia.” Rand Corporation. (2017): 48. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1731/RAND_RR1731.pdf

[vii] William Booth and Amie Ferris-Rotman. "Russia's Suez Canal? Ships Start Plying a Less-icy Arctic, Thanks to Climate Change." The Washington Post. September 08, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-suez-canal-ships-start-plying-an-ice-free-arctic-thanks-to-climate-change/2018/09/08/59d50986-ac5a-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.94d8dcbeec05.

[viii] Nikoloz Janjgava. "Disputes in the Arctic: Threats and Opportunities." Connections 11, no. 3 (2012): 4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326289.

[ix] Margaret Blunden. "Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 88, no. 1 (2012): 3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41428544.

[x] Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel and Scott Stephenson. “Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia.” Rand Corporation. (2017): 48. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1731/RAND_RR1731.pdf

[xi] Ibid. 40.

[xii] William Engdahl"The Huge Implications of Russia's Northern Sea Route." New Eastern Outlook. (2017). https://journal-neo.org/2017/11/22/the-huge-implications-of-russia-s-northern-sea-route/.