Ukraine and Belarus

Recent Events, Ukraine, and Belarus

This article has been produced by the following members:

David Herbut – Primary Author 

Marin Eidenberg – Editor and Group Leader

Recent developments in Ukraine have caused rifts in both the Belarusian government and its society. Belarus, which is headed by the strong-willed leader Alexander Lukashenko, has started to move away from its traditional ally, Russia. While Belarusian foreign policy is usually in line with Russia’s, the Ukrainian conflict has caused a divergence in Russian and Belarusian polices.  Belarus has refused to participate in the trade war that Russia has been conducting with Ukraine and the European Union (EU). Belarus still maintains its economic ties with Ukraine and Belarus has yet to impose the same kinds of counter-sanctions that Russia has imposed on European imported goods. Moreover, the Belarusian government, fearing a Russian intervention similar to that in Ukraine, has signed a new law stating that any involvement of unmarked armed groups in Belarus will prompt Belarus to declare war against the host nation of the armed group.

The Belarusian government has also been seen cooperating more closely with Western Europe. Belarus has been increasing the level of its participation in the EU Eastern partnership program. Talks between program officials and the Belarusian government may, for instance, produce an agreement on visa liberalization. A visa facilitation agreement could increase the level of work-related traffic between Belarus and the EU. This strengthening relationship may lead to further rapprochement between the two parties.

Still, this shift in Belarusian foreign policy should not mean that the Belarusian government is abandoning its Russian ally, nor should the warmer relations with the EU be a seen as a positive signal for foreign investors. Belarus still cooperates closely with the Russian government. For example, Belarus plays an active role in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and many of the gas pipelines belonging to Gazprom run directly through Belarus. Moreover, the Belarusian economy is largely state-driven with over 70% of all business being owned by the Belarusian government. The little foreign investment that does occur in Belarus is conducted by its neighbors to the east. In fact, Russian nationals conduct 40% of all foreign business with the remaining 60% being primarily from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics.

Furthermore, Belarusian society is still heavily integrated with Russian culture. The Institute for Independent Social and Economic Political Research (IISEPS) notes that 51.5% of Belarussians are in favour of integration with Russia over the EU. This figure is a 15.1% increase from the last poll, which was conducted in December 2013. Our team’s interviews with two Belarusians seem to confirm the close tie Belarusians feel with Russians. Lyudmila Ivanovich, for example, refers to Belarus as a ‘brother republic’ to Russia.  Sveta Petrovich notes that in spite of the divergence between governments, Belarusians maintain close relationships with Russians. Specifically, she says, familial networks, guest worker contracts, and business agreements have played large roles in meshing Belarusian and Russian societies together.

Belarus’ policy shift should not be seen as a move away from Russia but rather as a balancing act, or as a means to alleviate political risk. Belarus’ role in both of the Minsk protocols is a means for Belarus to demonstrate that it should be seen as an arbiter between conflicting parties. The Ukrainian conflict has put the Belarussian government in a precarious position and Lukashenko’s policy changes are a way to keep Belarusian nationalists quiet while maintaining economic ties with Russia.