Ukraine and the Baltics

Ukraine and the Baltic States

Wednesday March 18th, 2015 

Cameron Torrens – Primary Author

Martin Eidenberg – Editor and Group Leader

Keywords: Baltic States, Russia, NATO, Nord Stream

The Baltic States are increasingly fearful that Russia will begin to destabilize their region since the escalation of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Aside from Ukraine, the Baltic States have a sizable minority that is either ethnically and/or linguistically Russian. Although it is unlikely that Russia would provoke the Baltic region, anti-Russian propaganda has uprooted the majority-minority split in the region. Latvian Defense Minister Raimonds Vajonis and former NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen believe that Russia is extremely unpredictable and will be ready to react to any actions by the Latvian government. Government actions by politicians in the Baltic States are partially responsible for heightened security, uncertainty, and uneasiness within the region.

Unlike Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were admitted to NATO in 2004. Recently, NATO has stated that acts of aggression into the Baltic regions are a major threat to all members in NATO. To combat this Baltic concern, the United States has sent 3000 troops to the Baltic States’ Russian borders to deter possible future aggressions by Russia. In addition, NATO also put on a show of strength by dispatching 1300 troops, as well as tanks, to the Estonian-Russian border. In response, Russia has sent troops to the Pskov region, which borders both Estonia and Latvia. Tensions have continued to rise ever since the failure of the peace deal between Russia and Ukraine in combination with further Russian advancement into north-eastern regions of Ukraine. 

Despite Russia’s concerns over the exploitation of Russian minorities in the Baltic States, which is what the Russian government used to legitimize the unwarranted annexation of Crimea, there could be a potential underlying cause as to why Russia would provoke the Baltic region. Gas pipelines that pump Russian gas to Europe pass through the Baltic States and under the Baltic Sea. Increasing control over the Baltic Sea boundaries where the major gas pipeline, Nord Stream, is located could strengthen the power and influence over the supply and demand of natural gas between Russia and the EU. Connecting the Russian port city and gas hub of Vyborg with the German port city of Greifswald, the Nord Stream has been essential to the increased reliance upon Russian natural gas in Europe. There are no countries that the Nord Stream pipeline crosses and thus reduce transit costs and risks.

Although acquiring the Baltic territories does not result in gaining access to the Nord Stream, as it runs under the Baltic Sea in international waters, there is still a strategic advantage to possessing the states. There are many inland pipelines that directly flow into Russian territory and in turn to the Nord Stream to export natural gas to the rest of the EU. Hence, the conflict over the Baltic States has some of the same Russian motives that drove the annexation of Crimea.

If Germany were to threaten to close Greifswald as a counteractive measure against Russian advancement into the Baltics, it would significantly hurt the EU as well as Russia. In addition to the economic sanctions, Russia has begun to look eastward, specifically to China, as a new economic and energy partner moving forward. However, Germany and the EU cannot afford nor can it reproduce the amounts of natural gas that is necessary for Western European advancement. While the world watches tensions increase between the EU and Russia, the interests of Ukraine and the Baltic States have fallen into the background.